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The eighth progress report on economic, social and territorial cohesion highlights the regional and urban impact of the crisis. 
This report was adopted during the final days of the negotiations on cohesion policy period 2014 to 2020. This new period of 
Cohesion policy will start amidst the wreckage of the worst recession in the last fifty years, while some regions and countries 
continue to face a shrinking economy even in 2014. 
Between 2008 and 2012, unemployment increased in four out of five regions in the EU. In addition, GDP shrank in two out of 
three regions between 2007 and 2010. This crisis has a widespread effect including both more and less developed regions. 
As a result, the disparities between EU regions have started to grow again after a long period of convergence. Most capital 
metro regions have managed to withstand the crisis better than the other metro regions. Now the challenge is to ensure that 
all regions return to a positive growth path. 
As the crisis drags on, the impact on poverty and exclusion has started to emerge. The number of people at-risk-of-poverty-
and-exclusion has grown significantly since the start of the crisis. In particular, the number of people living in a household 
with a very low work intensity increased by more than 4 million between 2008 and 2011. Between 2008 and 2011, the at-risk-
of-poverty-and-exclusion increased twice as much in cities than in other areas. This was especially noticeable in the EU-15, 
where the poverty and exclusion rates were already higher in cities before the crisis. 
The next round of cohesion policy programmes should ensure that their investments in contribute most to overcoming the 
impact of the crisis on our regions and cities. 
Maximising the impact requires both the right institutional and economic context and selecting the best projects. That is why 
the Commission wants to invest more in improving administrative capacity and has linked Cohesion Policy to the broader EU 
economic governance to improve the conditions for growth. The best projects depend on the region or city, but they will 
often include measures to boost innovation, education, training, entrepreneurship and access to finance. 
Foreword
Johannes Hahn
Member of the European Commission 
in charge of Regional Policy
László Andor
Member of the European Commission in charge 
of Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion6
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In 2014, the Cohesion Policy programming period will start in 
the aftermath of the worst recession of the last fifty years. The 
crisis has reversed the process of convergence of regional 
GDP per head and unemployment within the EU. The chal-
lenge now is to ensure a prompt return to a strong growth 
path, especially in the less developed regions and cities.
To support the forthcoming programme negotiations, this 
report highlights the crisis-induced changes that will affect 
the context and priorities of the new programmes. The 
report first sets the scene with an overview of the main 
developments at national level. It then looks at the impact 
of the crisis on regions and cities and the growing dispari-
ties. Finally, it outlines how the changed economic environ-
ment will affect the future Cohesion programmes and 
underlines the need for a strong thematic concentration.
This report follows the 7th progress report, published in 
2010, and will be followed by the publication of the 6th 
Cohesion Report in 2014. The 6th Cohesion report will also 
cover issues such innovation, climate and environment, 
which could not be included here.
  1
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2.1. Contraction of GDP 
and employment
The EU entered a recession in the second quarter of 2008, 
which lasted five quarters. Since the recession, overall 
growth in terms of GDP has been sluggish. The EU’s GDP 
contracted again in the last quarter of 2011 and the first two 
and the last quarter of 2012. If GDP also contracts in the first 
quarter of 2013 it will have become a triple-dip recession. 
The overall impact of the crisis on GDP and employment 
between 2007 and 2011 has been highest in the three Baltic 
States, Ireland, Greece and Spain (see Annex Figure 1). The 
Baltic States and Ireland started growing again in 2010 or 
2011 and are forecast to continue to grow until 2014. 
Spain and Greece, however, have not returned to a consist-
ent growth path. Spain started growing in 2011, but its GDP 
contracted in 2012. Provisional GDP growth rates for Greece 
show a continuation and strengthening of the recession. Its 
GDP declined by around 7 % in 2011 and 2012 and may only 
start to grow in 2014.
In addition, Cyprus was confronted with a financial crisis in 
2012 which led to a harsh reduction of GDP and employ-
ment which is expected to continue until 2014. 
In contrast, nine Member States experienced a relatively 
mild recession or, in the case of Poland, merely a slowing 
down of growth. 
2.2. Deteriorating national 
and sub-national finance 
The economic and financial crisis has led to significant 
increases in total government debt (see Factsheet 1) in four 
ways. First, several national governments supported the 
financial sector through bank recapitalisation and assets 
transfers. Second, the slowing down of economic activity 
reduced tax receipts and increased social spending (e.g. 
unemployment benefits). Third, governments adopted stimu-
lus packages to boost demand. Fourth, the debt–to–GDP 
ratio is also driven upwards by low GDP growth.
As a result, the government debt-to-GDP ratio in the EU 
jumped between the first quarter of 2008 and the fourth 
quarter of 2012 from 59 % to 85 %. National increases were 
highest in Ireland (90 percentage points), Portugal (56 pp), 
Greece and Spain (both 49 pp). Member States that bought 
out failing banks may be able to reduce their debt by   
selling the banks remaining assets, but their value remains 
uncertain. 
High government debt can raise concerns about a govern-
ment’s ability to service its debt in the long run. This may lead 
to higher interest rates and payments. The higher taxes 
required to service the debt may act as a brake on growth. 
In the 2011-2013 period, many Member States have embarked 
on fiscal consolidation by primarily cutting expenditure 
(-1.5 % of EU GDP in 2011 compared to 2010). Mainly growth-
friendly expenditure was cut. Consequently, public invest-
ment (here: Gross Fixed Capital Formation) as a share of GDP 
will be lower in 18 Member States in 2013 than in 2011. These 
cuts may affect medium-term growth.
Public debt does not affect all countries equally. Estonia’s 
public debt is only 10 % of its GDP. Only 13 Member States 
have a public debt below 60 % of their GDP: the three Nordic 
Member States, Luxembourg and nine of the ten Central and 
Eastern Member States. The crisis affects sub-national govern-
ments in two ways. First, the crisis has led to a decrease of tax 
revenues and to tax cuts to stimulate growth. Second, the 
crisis has increased local demand for public services and 
social protection, triggering higher public expenditure. 
2
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Fiscal consolidation is putting pressure on sub-national gov-
ernments’ budgets. They still face higher levels of social 
expenditure and have to reduce expenditure and increase 
revenues. Their financial difficulties may affect delivery of 
public services. 
Growth-friendly fiscal consolidation should ensure that 
reductions in central government debt are not offset by an 
increase in sub-national government debt. This co-ordinated 
debt reduction should also ensure that growth-enhancing 
public investments, including those co-financed by Cohesion 
Policy, are maintained.
2.3. Construction and 
manufacturing most 
affected by the recession
Although the crisis started in the financial and insurance sec-
tor, this sector accounted for roughly the same amount of 
gross value added (GVA) and employment in the EU in 2011 as 
it did in 2007. In the six Member States most affected by the 
crisis, however, this sector’s employment dropped by 1 % and 
its GVA by 1.8 % a year between 2007 and 2011 (see Annex 
Figure 2).
Between 2007 and 2011, both GVA and employment in con-
struction declined by 3 % a year in the Union. In the six coun-
tries where the impact of the recession was greatest, the 
decline was even between 10 and 20 % a year for employ-
ment and between 6 % and 20 % for GVA.
These dramatic declines in the construction sector are linked 
to the real estate bubble and the ensuing collapse of real 
estate prices in several Member States. Between 2007 and 
2012, real estate prices dropped by between 30 % and 50 % in 
Ireland (1), Latvia and Estonia (see Factsheet 2). In Portugal, 
they have declined by -9 % so far. In Greece, Eurostat figures 
indicate moderate increase between 2007 and 2010, but other 
sources (2) indicate that prices have started to fall since 2010. 
Overall, more decreases cannot be excluded.
The manufacturing sector took a hit with a decrease of more 
than 2 % a year between 2007 and 2011. In the six most 
affected Member State, the annual average contraction was 
almost 5 %. The decrease in GVA was more moderate at 0.9 %. 
The changes of GVA were more variable with the biggest 
reductions over the period occurring in Greece (-6 %) and 
Finland (-5 %) and the biggest increases in Slovakia (8 %) and 
Ireland (4 %) (see Annex Figure 3). The contraction of manu-
facturing was closely tied to the contraction in trade.
2.4. Exports recovering
In the wake of the crisis, credit became scarce, which reduced 
investments and consumption. This reduced trade in goods 
and caused the recession to spread quickly to important trad-
ing partners, leading to further income and/or job losses. 
Although the 2004 enlargement gave a boost to EU trade, the 
crisis caused an abrupt drop (see Figure 1).
Exports were still growing in 2008, albeit at a much slower 
rate, whereas the growth in import volumes was close to zero. 
In 2009, exports and imports dropped by 15 % to a level com-
parable to that of 2005. 
The Central and Eastern Member States suffered the highest 
drop in imports (see Factsheet 3). Most of the countries that 
joined the EU after 2004 were enjoying a period of high eco-
nomic growth fuelled by high investments and consumption, 
before the crisis hit them.
In western Member States, exports dropped more than 
imports because, at least initially, domestic consumption and 
investments were less affected by the crisis. The global drop 
in demand led to a reduction in exports, causing production 
to fall in the manufacturing sector. Exports, fortunately, recov-
ered quickly with similar volumes in 2010 as in 2007. However, 
the consequences of the abrupt fall in exports continue to be 
felt in the labour market.
2.5. Foreign direct investments 
slowing down
As a result of the crisis, foreign direct investment (FDI) 
dropped rapidly. Many foreign investors directed available 
resources back to ‘mother’ companies. Joining the EU made 
it easier for the Central and Eastern Member States to access 
FDI thanks to the single market and the incorporation of the 
EU acquis. FDI can contribute to efficiency gains, transfer of 
innovative technologies and higher productivity in the receiv-
ing countries. Hence, FDI inflows play an important role in the 
less developed Member States for employment creation and 
modernisation of their economies.
 1.  2007-2010
 2.  Economist Housing Index9
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Figure 1: Changes in EU trade volume, 2000-2011
Figure 2: Foreign Direct Investment in the EU, 2004-2011
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Foreign direct inward investment flows from other Member 
States and from outside the Union grew rapidly between 
2004 and 2007. Inward investments flows quadrupled 
between 2004 and 2007 (see Figure 2). Inward investment 
flows fell in 2008 and 2009 when the global credit situation 
deteriorated. The lowest point, in 2010, corresponded to the 
level of 2004. In 2011 the flows grew again. 
Foreign direct investment flows do not show the stock of for-
eign investment. Stocks held in other countries increased by 
almost 60 % between 2004 and 2007. This rise was never 
reversed. By 2011, foreign-owned stocks were more than 
twice as high than in 2004.
In some EU countries, FDI inflows are a major source of capital 
and investments. For example, average FDI net inflows as pro-
portion of GDP between 2005 and 2007 were between 15 % 
and 23 % in Bulgaria, Malta, Belgium and Estonia. The crisis 
led to a rapid reduction of FDI inflows in ten Central and 
Eastern Member States. It dropped by between 1.5 % and 6 % 
of their GDP between the periods 2005-07 and 2008-10, with 
the exception of Bulgaria, where it dropped by 12 % of its GDP 
(see Factsheet 4).
2.6. Increasing risk of poverty 
and exclusion
At EU level, the crisis increased the population at risk of pov-
erty or social exclusion. Between 2009 and 2011, the share 
increased by one percentage point. All three components (at-
risk-of-poverty rate, severe material deprivation and very low 
work intensity) are also on the rise, in particular very low work 
intensity (see Figure 3). This impact is likely to be felt more in 
the future as the crisis is not over yet and the effect takes time 
to filter through. 
The impact on the risk of poverty or exclusion was the highest 
in the six most affected Member States, but the impact in Italy 
and Bulgaria was also significant. Several of the large Member 
States, however, had only small increases, such as Germany 
and the UK, or even a slight reduction of the risk of poverty or 
exclusion, such as Poland and Romania.
In the wake of the crisis, many people were faced with a lower 
income due to job losses or reductions in hours and wages. 
In the six most affected MS countries, real gross adjusted   
disposable income dropped substantially after the crisis   
(see Figure 4).
In the Baltic States real adjusted disposable household 
income per capita grew rapidly between 2005 and 2008 and 
then experienced a sharp drop. In Latvia, disposable income 
shrank by nearly a fifth in 2009. Since 2010 disposable income 
has been growing again in all three Member States, but none 
have reached the pre-crisis level. 
In Greece, Spain and Ireland, which have considerably higher 
levels of disposable income than the Baltic states, the picture 
is more mixed. In Spain and Ireland, the effect of the crisis only 
started to be felt in 2009. Since then, both countries have lost 
around 8 % of their disposable income, returning them to 
2005 levels. In Greece, the decline in disposable income 
started slowly in 2007. In 2009 and 2010 it took a very sharp 
downturn. As a result, Greek disposable income in 2011 was 
well below its 2005 level.
Due to reductions in the median income, and thus the pov-
erty threshold, the at-risk-of-poverty rate often goes down 
during a recession. This section will use a poverty threshold 
fixed at the 2005 level to avoid this effect. 
Figure 3: Poverty and social exclusion in the EU, 2005-2011
At risk of poverty or exclusion 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
At risk of poverty or exclusion 25.6 25.2 24.4 23.5 23.1 23.4 24.2
At risk of poverty 16.4 16.5 16.5 16.4 16.3 16.4 16.9
Very low work intensity* 10.3 10.5 9.6 9.0 9.0 10.0 10.0
Severe Material deprivation 10.7 9.8 9.1 8.4 8.1 8.1 8.8
* population aged 0-59
Source: Eurostat11
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Figure 5: At risk-of-poverty rate with 2005 threshold, 2006-2011
Figure 4: Real gross adjusted disposable household income per head, 2005-2011
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In Ireland, the share of people at risk of poverty relative to the 
2005 threshold increased from 10 % in 2008 to over 15 % in 
2010 (see Figure 5). This share reached 20 % in Spain and 23 % 
in Greece. Due to the high income growth of the early part of 
the 2005 to 2011 period,  the at-risk-of-poverty rates relative 
to the 2005 threshold only grew slightly post-crisis in the 
Baltic States, reaching 10 % or less, and did not reach the pre-
crisis levels.
The share of people at risk of poverty relative to the 2005 
threshold increased slightly in Belgium, Hungary, Germany, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the UK. In the remaining 
parts of the EU, it declined or remained stable.
The share of population aged 0 to 59 living in a household 
with a very-low-work intensity increased post crisis, but   
still remained below 2006 values at the EU level. In the 
six most affected Member States, however, this share has 
increased with between 4 and 9 pp between 2007 and 2011 
(see Figure 6). 
Figure 6: Very low work intensity, 2005-2011
The share of severely materially deprived population, i.e. 
those unable to afford 4 out of 9 basic items, decreased at the 
EU level from 11 % to 8 % between 2005 and 2010. The highest 
shares can be found in Romania and Bulgaria and both man-
aged to reduce the share of severe materially deprived popu-
lation to 31 % and 35 % in 2010. In 2011, however, the EU share 
increased again.
Between 2008 and 2011, severe material deprivation 
increased most in Latvia (3) (12 pp), Lithuania (6pp), Hungary 
(5pp) and Greece (4pp). In 2010, Ireland’s share increased by 
2 pp to 7.5 %, which is high given its income levels. Spain, with 
a slightly lower income level, only had a rate of 4 %. Poland 
achieved a remarkable reduction of its share of severely mate-
rially deprived persons, from 18 % in 2008 to 13 % in 2011.
For a more detailed analysis of changes in poverty and social 
exclusion, including poverty depth, see Chapter 2 of the 
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2012 
Report (4).
Share of population aged 0 to 59 in living in very low work intensity households, 2005-2011
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2007–2011
Estonia 9.4 7.0 6.2 5.3 5.6 8.9 9.9 3.7
Greece 7.5 8.0 8.0 7.4 6.5 7.5 11.8 3.8
Spain 6.5 6.0 6.3 6.2 7.0 9.8 12.2 5.9
Lithuania 9.5 8.3 6.4 5.1 6.9 9.2 12.3 5.9
Latvia 8.1 7.0 6.1 5.1 6.7 12.2 12.2 6.1
Ireland 14.6 12.8 14.2 13.6 19.8 22.9 n/a 8.7
Source: Eurostat
3.   Part of this increase may be due to a break in the series. 
4.   http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=738&langId=en&pubId=7315 13
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The crisis brought to an end a long period during which 
regional disparities in GDP per head and unemployment were 
shrinking. Between 2000 and 2008, regional disparities in GDP 
per head dropped every single year (see Figure 7). In 2009, 
those reductions came to a halt and grew in 2010 and 2011. 
Figure 7: Regional convergence and the crisis
Regional unemployment rates had been converging from 2001 
to 2007, but then increased every year from 2007 until 2012. The 
EU-15 have also witnessed increasing disparities since 2007 for 
both GDP per head and regional unemployment.
3.1. GDP and employment in the 
first three years of the crisis 
Two thirds of the regions suffered a contraction of GDP of up 
to -6 % a year between 2007 and 2010. The ten regions where 
GDP shrank fastest between 2007 and 2010 include the three 
Baltic States and seven regions from seven different Member 
States (See Factsheet 5). GDP shrank by more than 3 % a year 
in these regions. None of the Spanish or Greek regions appear 
among these regions. Spain does not appear in the top ten 
because it suffered a smaller GDP reduction than employ-
ment reduction. Greece does not appear in the top ten 
because most of the GDP contractions occurred after 2010. In 
2012, Cyprus saw the start of a contraction in employment 
and GDP which is expected to continue into 2014. 
In several Member States, the capital region has the highest 
growth rate, including Bulgaria, Germany, Slovakia, and 
Poland. 
One out of two regions saw its total employment shrink over 
the same period. Employment dropped by more than 4 % 
a year in the Baltic States, three Spanish regions, the two Irish 
regions and one region in Bulgaria (see Factsheet 5). The con-
traction in Greek employment happened only after 2010, 
which is why they do not appear among the worst affected 
regions.
Overall, the link between regional GDP and employment 
change is weak during these years, as it takes time for reduc-
tions in output to affect employment. In addition, several   
policies were aimed directly at maintaining (part-time) employ-
ment during the crisis. 
3.2. Unemployment increasing 
especially in southern 
regions
At EU level, unemployment rates increased from 7 % to 10 % 
between 2008 and 2012. Unemployment rates in the most 
affected Member States, however, doubled or even tripled 
with increases above 8 pp in five Member States and up to 
17 pp in Spain (see Factsheet 6). Unemployment rates, in the 
five most affected Member States for this indicator, ranged 
from 12 % in Cyprus to 25 % in Spain (5).
Unemployment increased significantly also in Latvia, Estonia, 
Slovenia, Slovakia and Denmark. On the other hand, unem-
ployment rates actually dropped in Germany and barely 
changed in Luxembourg, Malta, Belgium and Austria.
Overall, more than four out of five EU regions were faced with 
an increase between 2008 and 2010. Most saw the biggest 
increase in this period. More than one third of these regions 
have managed to reduce unemployment since 2010. 
In line with the recommendations in the European Economic 
Recovery Plan, several Member States set up measures to 
prevent excessive labour shedding, and to increasing the 
coverage and duration of benefits. 
Youth unemployment increased from 16 % in 2008 to 21 % in 
2011 at the EU level (see Factsheet 7). In 52 regions, one out 
of three economically active young people were unem-
ployed. In 11 of those regions it was even one out of two, 
mostly in Spain and Greece. Also the share of people aged 
15 to 24 not in employment, education or training (NEET) has 
risen: between 2008 and 2011 NEET rates increased in almost 
four out of five regions, especially in Romania, Greece and the 
UK (See Factsheet 8).
3
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5.     For a more extensive analysis, see the Employment and Social Developments in Europe Report 2012.  
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3.3. Migration slowing down
Between 2004 and 2008, the number of residents living out-
side their country of citizenship in the EU-27 increased by 
1.5 million a year. As a result, the corresponding proportion 
of the total EU-27 population grew from 5.1 % to 6.2 %. For 
the years 2009 to 2011, the annual increase dropped to 
0.9 million, leading to a share of 6.7 % in 2011. 
Between 2004 and 2008, Ireland, Spain, and Cyprus wit-
nessed an increase of their share of foreign population of 
over 4 pp, mostly from the Member States who joined in 
2004 or 2007. Over that period, Italy, Portugal, Luxemburg 
and the UK also experienced a substantial increase of the 
share of foreign citizens. 
The biggest effect of the crisis on migration was in regions 
that experienced largest inflows of labour migrants in the 
pre-crisis period. The slowdown in migration was strongest 
in Spain, Ireland, Cyprus and some regions of the UK and 
Italy (see Factsheet 9), but remained positive. Many regions 
of Spain, southern France and northern Italy still had some 
of the highest levels of positive net migration. 
The crisis accelerated emigration in Lithuania and Latvia. In 
Poland, negative net migration became less negative in the 
border regions and positive net migration of the capital 
region increased. The negative net migration was shrunk in 
Romania due to return migration from Spain. As the crisis 
continues to unfold, the increasing differences in regional 
unemployment rates and wages may still further affect 
migration. 
The rapid decline of employment in construction and indus-
try contributed to the decline in net migration in Spanish 
regions and in Northern Italy. Net-migration tended to drop 
more in regions with a high share of migrants from other 
Member States. 
Figure 7: Regional convergence and the crisis
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4
The urban impact
To analyse the urban impact, this report uses two spatial 
approaches: metro regions and cities. 
(1)  Metro regions are NUTS-3 regions that represent urban 
agglomerations of more than 250 000 inhabitants. This 
approach allows an urban interpretation of GDP and 
employment changes. 
(2)  Cities are defined at the national level and capture the 
main cities in the EU. This approach provides access to 
data on employment and poverty.
4.1. Metro regions mix resilience 
and vulnerability
In two out of three Member States (6), metro regions on aver-
age increased their GDP per head in PPS relative to the coun-
try as a whole between 2007 and 2010 (see Annex Figure 4). 
In the twelve Member States that increased their GDP per 
head relative to the EU, their metro regions outperformed the 
rest of the country. In eight of the twelve Member States that 
had a decline in GDP per head relative to the EU, GDP per 
head in metro regions declined faster than in the country as 
a whole. 
This pattern of faster GDP growth in growing economies and 
faster decline in most declining economies could mean that 
urban economies are more volatile and succeptible to booms 
and busts.
Despite the strong overall performance of metro regions, over 
three out of five saw their GDP per head drop between 2007 
and 2010 relative to the national level. Smaller metros lost 
most ground with 74 % of them declining relative their coun-
try. Also second-tier metros suffered with 54 % losing ground. 
Only capital metro showed a stronger performance with only 
30 % losing ground. 
In most Member States, employment (7) in metro regions was 
more resistant to the crisis than in non-metro regions 
between 2007 and 2010 (see Annex Figure 5). Only in Finland, 
Greece, Hungary and Latvia did employment in non-metro 
regions decline more slowly than in metro regions. 
Similar to GDP per head changes, not all metro regions expe-
rienced stronger employment change than their country. 
Only half of the metro regions experienced a milder employ-
ment decline (or faster employment growth) than the non-
metro regions in their country. Slightly more than half the 
second-tier metros outpaced their country. Slightly less than 
half of the smaller metros performed better than their coun-
try. Capital metros performed much better: nine out of ten 
had with a stronger employment performance. Nine capital 
metros even achieved employment growth despite a decline 
in national employment. 
In the UK and Spain roughly half of the metro regions had 
a worse employment performance than the non-metro 
regions. In Greece and Hungary almost all metro regions per-
formed worse. In the majority of the Member States, however, 
all or most metro regions had a better employment perfor-
mance than the non-metro regions. This was particularly evi-
dent in Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Romania and 
Bulgaria.
In these first three years of the crisis, most metro regions 
showed themselves to be resilient, especially the capital city 
metro regions. The second-tier metros performed less well. 
The smaller metros proved quite vulnerable with the majority 
lagging behind in terms of GDP per head and employment 
changes.
4.2. Cities in crisis
Poverty and social exclusion are concentrated in cities, espe-
cially in North-western Europe. The crisis has further intensified 
this concentration. The at-risk-of-poverty-or-social-exclusion 
(AROPE) rate increased by 1 pp in cities in the EU, compared to 
an increase of 0.5 pp outside cities (see Figure 8). 
In 2011, people living in cities in the EU-15 were at greater risk 
of poverty or social exclusion than those living outside cities 
(see Figure 9). Also the three components of this risk are 
higher in cities than outside. In the EU-12, the situation tends 
to be the opposite. People living in cities have a considerably 
lower risk of poverty or social exclusion. 
6.     This analysis excludes Luxembourg, Malta and Cyprus.
7.     This analysis excludes Luxembourg, Malta, Cyprus and Italy.16
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Figure 8: Change in the risk of poverty 
or social exclusion, 2008-2011
EU27 AROPE AROP LWI SMD
Cities 1.0 0.6 0.9 0.5
Other areas 0.5 0.5 1.1 0.3
EU15
Cities 1.2 0.6 1.2 0.7
Other areas 0.9 0.3 1.4 0.9
EU12
Cities -0.4 0.3 -0.3 -0.7
Other areas -1.0 0.8 0.3 -1.5
Source: Eurostat
Severe material deprivation is higher in cities in 18 Member 
States. Very low work intensity is more prevalent in cities in 
15 Member States (see Factsheet 10). The poverty risk is 
higher in cities in 10 Member States. 
The high share of very low work intensity households in cities 
with their high concentration of jobs is somewhat paradoxi-
cal. This may be due to skills mismatch, precarious jobs or the 
higher share of one-person households in cities. It may also 
be related to the higher proportion of residents born outside 
the EU in cities. 
In 11 of the EU-15 Member States (8), people born outside the 
EU were much more likely to live in a household with a very 
low work intensity. In 2010, the very low work intensity rate of 
those not born in the EU was at least six pp higher than for 
people born in the country they are living in. Many non-EU 
born persons face multiple barriers to entering the labour 
market, such as not speaking the local language, lack of skills, 
lack of recognition of their qualifications and discrimination. 
As with poverty and social exclusion, cities in the more devel-
oped Member States tend to have lower employment rates and 
higher unemployment rates than towns, suburbs and rural 
areas (see Figure 10), while the opposite is the case in less devel-
oped Member States. The crisis has not altered this pattern. 
Figure 9: Risk of poverty or social  
exclusion in cities, 2011
EU27 AROPE AROP LWI SMD
Cities 23.3 15.7 11.0 8.4
Other areas 25.0 18.0 9.1 9.2
EU15
Cities 23.1 16.8 12.0 6.8
Other areas 21.9 16.6 9.2 5.3
EU12
Cities 24.1 9.9 6.5 16.5
Other areas 34.5 22.2 8.9 20.8
Source: Eurostat
Figure 10: Employment and unemployment in cities and other areas, 2008-2011
Employment rate, 20-64 Unemployment rate
2011 Change 2008-2011 2011 Change 2008-2011
EU27
Cities 64.5 -1.8 10.1 2.6
Other areas 64.0 -1.9 9.4 2.6
EU15
Cities 65.0 -1.7 10.3 2.6
Other areas 66.0 -1.6 9.1 2.5
EU12
Cities 62.4 -1.4 9.0 3.3
Other areas 58.3 -1.8 10.3 2.9
Source: Eurostat
8.   The only exceptions were Italy, Greece, Portugal and Luxembourg.17
Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council
Eighth progress report on economic, social and territorial cohesion
This report outlines a few of the key issues that cohesion pro-
grammes should consider for 2014-20 period. 
The crisis has made it more difficult to reach the Europe 2020 
goals due to reduced employment rates and increasing pov-
erty and social exclusion. Moreover, widening regional dis-
parities are undermining one of the key goals of the European 
Union and Cohesion Policy. 
Although some Member States, such as Germany and Poland, 
have escaped the crisis relatively unscathed, most will face 
more problems and fewer public resources. These include, for 
many if not most Member States:
•    GDP and employment levels which have not 
yet returned to pre-crisis levels.
•    Higher levels of unemployment, poverty 
and exclusion.
•    Reduced household income, which depresses  
consumption and imports.
•    Unprecedented levels of public debt and  
the need for fiscal consolidation.
The report shows that the intensity of problems varies signifi-
cantly throughout Europe. This suggests that the design of 
future cohesion programmes should reflect these differences 
to maximise impact and target problems where they are more 
acute. 
Against this background, the future cohesion programmes 
will have to put particular emphasis on growth-enhancing 
and job creating-investments. Only a stable and strong recov-
ery can reduce the unemployment rates. 
This is why the Commission is proposing to concentrate 
resources on a few, important areas such as employment   
(particularly for young people), training and education, social 
inclusion, innovation and SMEs, energy efficiency and a low-
carbon economy and is open to expand it to ICT infrastruc-
tures and digital growth measures
5
Cohesion policy and the crisis
Exports and foreign direct investment constitute a major 
engine of growth in less developed Member States, help-
ing to create jobs and transferring knowledge and technol-
ogy. SMEs, one of the main target groups of Cohesion Policy,  
are particularly affected by the deteriorating the business   
environment. In a context of low internal demand, export-
ing more goods and services will help to revive growth. 
Investments in innovation and smart specialisation could 
improve the performance of this sector. 
The construction sector will continue to suffer from the con-
sequences of the banking crisis, owing to limited access to 
credit, the bursting of the housing bubble, and the reduced 
disposable household income and income security. Investing 
in energy efficiency of buildings could help to restore some 
of the jobs lost in this sector. 
The risk of poverty or exclusion increased at EU level and may 
continue to rise due to the delayed impact of the crisis on 
poverty and exclusion. 
Fiscal consolidation will further increase the role of Cohesion 
Policy as an important source of public investment in the 
period 2014-20. In fact, in many of the less developed Member 
States and regions, cohesion funding already represents more 
than half of their public investment. The Commission urges 
Member States and regions to start preparing the new pro-
grammes without delay so that no time is lost in ensuring that 
projects needed to revive economic activity and support 
social inclusion can start at the beginning of next year. 19
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Annual average change in %, 2007-2011 Impact of the 
recession GDP Employment Combined*
EU-27 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 Moderate
EU-15 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 Moderate
EU-12** 1.6 -0.1 0.7 Low
Latvia -4.5 -6.4 -5.5 Very high
Greece -3.9 -1.9 -2.9 Very high
Ireland -1.8 -3.9 -2.8 Very high
Lithuania -1.5 -2.7 -2.1 Very high
Estonia -2.0 -2.1 -2.1 Very high
Spain -0.7 -2.7 -1.7 Very high
Portugal -0.6 -1.3 -1.0 High
Denmark -1.0 -0.8 -0.9 High
Bulgaria 0.6 -2.3 -0.8 High
Hungary -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 High
Italy -1.1 -0.4 -0.8 High
Slovenia -0.7 -0.8 -0.8 High
Romania 0.3 -1.0 -0.3 Moderate
UK -0.6 -0.1 -0.3 Moderate
Finland -0.7 0.2 -0.2 Moderate
France 0.0 -0.1 0.0 Moderate
Netherlands 0.2 0.3 0.2 Moderate
Czech Rep. 0.7 -0.1 0.3 Moderate
Cyprus 0.9 0.5 0.7 Low
Belgium 0.6 0.9 0.7 Low
Austria 0.6 0.9 0.8 Low
Sweden 1.1 0.5 0.8 Low
Germany 0.7 0.8 0.8 Low
Slovakia 2.0 0.4 1.2 Low
Luxembourg -0.1 2.7 1.3 Low
Malta 1.4 1.6 1.5 Low
Poland 3.7 1.4 2.6 Low
* Average of change in GDP and change in employment
** EU-12 are the Member States that joined in 2004 and 2007
Source: Eurostat
Figure 1: Member States grouped by impact of recession, 2007-2011
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The general government debt is defined as the consolidated 
gross debt of the whole of the general government sector 
outstanding at the end of the quarter (at nominal value). The 
general government sector comprises central government, 
state government, local government, and social security 
funds. The debt is measured as a percentage of GDP. 
Why does this matter?
The Maastricht Treaty specifies government debt must not 
exceed 60 % of GDP unless it is sufficiently diminishing and 
approaching 60 % at a satisfactory pace. Unsustainable levels 
of public debt undermine macro-economic stability, increase 
government spending interests and the higher taxes required 
to service the debt may act as a drag on growth. 
How do the EU Member States score?
Government debt-to-GDP ratios increased drastically over 
the 2008-2012 period in both the euro area (24.9 percentage 
points) and in the EU-27 (26.2 p.p.), sustained by government 
budget deficits (negative primary balances), increasing inter-
est payments and lower nominal GDP growth. During the 
crisis, the total debt-to-GDP ratio of EU-27 registered a nega-
tive trend, peaking at 85.2 % in the last quarter of 2012 (latest 
available data).
The highest ratios of government debt to GDP are recorded 
in Greece (156.9 %), Italy (127.0 %) and Portugal (123.6 %). The 
total government debt is higher than the annual GDP also in 
Ireland, and close to this level in Belgium. The lowest ratios, 
instead, are registered in Estonia (10.1 %), Bulgaria (18.5 %) 
and Luxembourg (20.8 %). The values of the last quarter of 
2012 represent a peak (since 2000) for eleven countries, 
including Germany, Portugal, Netherlands and the UK. 
Greece, instead, peaked (170.3 %) in the fourth quarter of 
2011 and decrease is mainly due to the exchange of bonds. 
Also Hungary (79.2 %) improved its situation compared to the 
peak recorded in the second quarter of 2010 (85.3 %).
The highest increases between 2008 and 2012 are registered 
in Ireland, where the ratio increased by a staggering 90.0 per-
centage points, Portugal (56.1) and Greece (49.0). 
The debt to GDP ratio increased in all EU-27 countries, although 
Sweden (+0.2 p.p.), Bulgaria (+3.1 p.p.) and Estonia (+6.0 p.p.), 
starting from a very low base) registered a mild increase. 
This table shows the five countries with the highest 
government debt-to-GDP ratio
Country General Government Gross Debt, 
fourth quarter 2012
Greece 156.9
Italy 127.0
Portugal 123.6
Ireland 117.6
Belgium 99.6
This table shows the five countries with the biggest 
increase of government debt-to-GDP ratio
Country General Government Gross Debt, first 
quarter 2008 - fourth quarter 2012
Ireland 90.0
Portugal 56.1
Greece 49.0
Spain 48.6
UK 46.7
1.   Public debt25 25
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2.   House Price Index (HPI)
House Price Indices (HPIs) measure inflation in the residential 
property market. The HPI captures price changes of all kinds 
of residential property purchased by households (flats, 
detached houses, terraced houses, etc.), both new and exist-
ing. Only market prices are considered, self-build dwellings 
are therefore excluded. The land component of the residen-
tial property is included. 
Why does this matter?
Rapid increases in housing prices reduce the affordability of 
housing, especially for first-time buyers. Rapid reductions in 
housing prices lead to mortgages which are higher than the 
current value of the house, so-called negative equity. These 
reductions also lead to fewer transactions on the housing 
market, with effects on mobility of workers.
How do the EU Member States score?
Housing market bubbles have been one of the main macro-
economic imbalances leading to the current economic crisis. 
Household indebtedness is closely linked with housing mar-
ket developments: growth in credit to households, house 
price increases and high residential investment went hand 
in hand during the decade preceding the crisis, leading to 
higher indebtedness of the private sector. While the length 
and the speed of this expansion has shown significant vari-
ations across countries, house prices peaked in a vast major-
ity of Member States in 2007/2008 (1), ending a particularly 
pronounced price cycle across the EU. In 2006-2007, half of 
the Member States where data is available recorded price 
increases above 6 %/year, a threshold considered as an alert 
of internal imbalances (2).
Taking into account the 2007-2012 period, house prices con-
tracted considerably in Ireland (-49.5 %, until 2010), Latvia 
(-35.7 %) and Estonia (-30.2 %). In Ireland house prices in 2010 
were significantly lower than in 2005. A substantial decrease 
between 2007 and 2012 was also registered Spain (-28.0 %), 
and Romania (-26.1 %, 2010-2012). 
Between 2007 and 2012, house prices kept on increasing 
considerably in Sweden (+16.3 %), Luxembourg (+15.1 %), 
Finland (+14.8 %) and Belgium (+14.0 %), and at a slower pace 
in Malta (+8.2 %), Germany (+6.8 %) and France (+4.5 %). 
This table shows the five countries with  
the highest drop of house prices
Country House Price Index, 2007-2012
Ireland (2007-2010) -49.5
Latvia -35.7
Estonia -30.2
Spain -28.0
Romania (2009-2012) -26.1
1.   http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/documents/alert_mechanism_report_2012_en.pdf
2.   Ibid.27 27
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3.   Trade in Goods, 2008-2009
International trade refers to selling (exports) or buying (imports) 
of goods and services along international borders. The analysis 
is based on the trade volume index. It accounts, simultaneously, 
for change in prices and in volumes of  export and import;   
therefore it is a suitable indicator of change over time.
Why does this matter?
Through export, countries can expand their market, which 
is important in particular for countries with small domestic 
markets. Imports can increase competition on the domestic 
market and improve the choice of goods and services avail-
able to consumers, at lower prices. A positive balance of 
exports and imports (trade surplus) contributes to GDP 
growth. A negative balance (trade deficit) lowers GDP.
How do the EU countries score?
As the crisis spread across the economies, people started to 
consume less and firms started to buy less intermediate 
goods. This led to a serious contraction in both, exports and 
imports of goods and services, worldwide. 
In the EU, the Central and Eastern countries, suffered the 
highest drop in imports. The countries in the table saw their 
imports falling by a nearly a quarter in Bulgaria to nearly 
a third in Latvia, in just one year. Most of the countries that 
joined the EU after 2004 were enjoying a period of high eco-
nomic growth fuelled by high investments and high con-
sumption, before the crisis hit them. At the same time, 
imports grew significantly. The crisis brought this develop-
ment to a halt during at least two years (2008-2010) before 
imports started to grow again. 
The effect of the crisis on trade in the less developed MS was 
higher on imports, whereas the import of intermediate 
products, which will be transformed and exported again, is 
likely to increase apace with the exports. Imports of final 
consumption goods will only grow when disposable house-
hold income starts to grow again. 
The four of the five countries with a reduction in exports of 
18 % or more (see table) have a GDP per head above the EU 
average. In general, the decline in trade was associated 
mainly with falling exports in the more developed MS, indi-
cating that the consumption of final goods did not drop as 
quickly as in the less developed MS.
In general, imports fell faster than exports and took also 
longer to recover. By 2011 most of the EU countries reached 
or nearly reached their trade volumes from the pre-crisis 
period. However, the consequence of such abrupt fall in con-
sumption and production, for their labour market will take 
much longer to recover.
This table shows the five countries with  
the highest reduction in the import volume 
index from 2008 to 2009, in %
Country Imports, 2008-2009
Latvia -28.8
Lithuania -27.0
Romania -26.4
Estonia -25.1
Bulgaria -23.9
This table shows the five countries with  
the highest reduction in the export volume 
index from 2008 to 2009, in %
Country Exports, 2008-2009
Finland -26.1
Sweden -19.6
Italy -18.8
Austria -18.4
Malta -18.029 29
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4.   Foreign Direct Investments
Foreign direct investment is an investment made by a com-
pany or entity based in one country, into a company or 
entity based in another country in order to acquire a lasting 
interest (10 percent or more of voting stock). The difference 
in inward and outward FDI is called FDI balance. It is usually 
expressed with relation to a country’s GDP. 
Why does this matter?
A negative FDI balance means that a country receives more 
investment from abroad than it sends abroad. As a result, 
a negative FDI balance leads to higher private investments. 
This will boost the economic activity in a country. In addi-
tion, it can contribute to efficiency gains, transfer of innova-
tive technologies and higher productivity. 
How do EU countries score?
The table shows the countries with the where net inflows were 
much higher than net outflow as a share of GDP. Most of them 
are relatively small and open economies with skilled workforce. 
With the exception of Belgium, they are all Member States with 
GDP per head (well) below the EU average. 
Joining the EU may have contributed to increase of FDI in sev-
eral of the Central and Eastern Member States due to the access 
to the single market and the incorporation of the EU acquis into 
national legislation. 
Foreign direct investment dropped rapidly in 2008 and 2009 
as global credit conditions started to deteriorate. The fall was 
more substantial for inflows than outflows of FDI, which led to 
significantly lower investments in the main recipient of FDI in 
the EU.
Bulgaria experienced the biggest reduction in inward FDI   
as share of GDP (-12 pp). Nevertheless, it still is one of the   
main destinations for investors in the EU. This is also the case 
for Malta.
Among the ten Member States with the biggest drop in inward 
FDI, there are four Western MS. This is not so surprising for 
small, open economies such as Luxembourg, Denmark and the 
Netherlands, but it also includes the large economy of the UK, 
where it dropped by 4 pp.
In 2011, FDI flows showed strong signs of a recovery. Both flows 
from one EU country to another and from the outside the EU 
into the EU increased substantially compared to 2010.
This table shows the countries with the highest negative 
net FDI balance as a share of GDP in 2008-10, 
i.e. the biggest net recipients of FDI
Country Net FDI Balance, 2008-10 
Bulgaria -9.7
Malta -9.1
Romania -3.8
Estonia -3.8
Belgium -3.6
Cyprus -2.8
Portugal -2.0
Latvia -1.7
Lithuania -1.6
Poland -1.6
This table shows the countries with biggest reduction of 
inward FDI as a share of GDP from 2005-07 to 2008-10, in pp
Country Difference in inward FDI,  
2005-07 to 2008-10
Bulgaria -11.9
Netherlands -6.9
Malta -6.7
Luxembourg -6.4
Estonia -6.3
Latvia -5.0
Slovakia -4.2
United Kingdom -3.9
Czech Republic -3.6
Denmark -3.531 31
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5.   Change in GDP and Employment, 
2007-2010
These two indicators measure the average annual change 
in GDP and employment between 2007 and 2010, i.e. the 
average growth in 2008, 2009 and 2010.
Why does this matter? 
Reductions in GDP lead to lower incomes and reduce gov-
ernment revenues. Reductions in employment increase 
unemployment and demands for unemployment benefits. 
How do the EU regions score? 
Two out of three EU regions suffered a contraction of their 
GDP between 2007 and 2010. 
The ten regions where GDP shrunk fastest include the   
three Baltic States and one of the two Irish regions. It does 
not include a Spanish region as they suffered more from 
employment than GDP losses. 
For Greece no regional growth figures are available. The 
country’s GDP shrunk by -2.5 % a year over that period and 
the contraction of GDP was even harsher after 2010. 
The growing regions are mainly located in Poland, Germany, 
Sweden, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. 
More than one out of two regions suffered a reduction of 
employment between 2007 and 2010. Employment reductions 
were particularly high in Spain, Ireland and the Baltic States. In 
Greece, employment only shrunk by 0.7 % between 2007 and 
2010 and lost far more employment in 2011 and 2012. 
Bulgaria and Romania both have regions which saw big 
declines in employment. National level data shows that 
employment continued to decline in 2011, but Romania 
managed return to growth in 2012. 
The regions with employment growth were mainly located 
in Poland, Germany, Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg. 
This table shows the ten regions where GDP shrunk fastest 
between 2007 and 2010, in % average annual change
MS Region GDP growth 2007-2010, %
LV Latvija -6.2
EE Eesti -4.8
HU Észak-Magyarország -4.0
FI Etelä-Suomi -3.7
LT Lietuva -3.5
HU Közép-Dunántúl -2.8
IT Molise -2.0
DK Sjælland -1.7
BG Severozapaden -1.6
IE Border, Midland & Western -1.6
This table shows the ten regions where employment 
shrunk fastest between 2007 and 2010, in % average  
annual change
MS Region Employment growth 
2007-2010, %
BG Severozapaden -6.2
LV Latvija -5.9
IE Border, Midland & Western -5.2
EE Eesti -5.0
ES Comunidad Valenciana -4.7
ES Cantabria -4.5
IE Southern & Eastern -4.3
LT Lietuva -4.2
ES Comunidad Foral 
de Navarra
-4.0
ES Ciudad Autónoma 
de Melilla
-3.933 33
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6. Unemployment, 2012
This indicator measures the number of people aged 15-74 
who are without work but looking for work and available for 
work, divided by the number of people aged 15-74 and active 
in the labour market, i.e. those employed and unemployed. 
Why does this matter?
High unemployment is a threat to social cohesion leading 
to poverty and social exclusion and it is one of the most 
important incentives for people to leave their regions.
How do the EU regions score? 
Regional disparities in unemployment among the EU-27 
regions remain high. More than one region in three has an 
unemployment rate above 10 %. The highest rates are reg-
istered in Spain, Greece and in the overseas departments of 
France. In the top-30 regions in terms of unemployment, 
29 are located in these three countries. 
The regions recording unemployment rates above 15 % are 
almost one out of five (one out of ten in 2010). In contrast, 
about one region out of six registers unemployment rates 
below 5 % (a total of 45, an increase from the 41 regions in 
2011). These regions are mainly located in Austria, Germany, 
Belgium and Netherlands. 
It is possible to identify different trends for the period 2008-
2012. Between 2008 and 2012 unemployment increased in 
four out of five regions. The crisis hit severely regions of 
Spain, Greece, Ireland and the Baltic States. Instead, unem-
ployment dropped almost exclusively in German regions, 
especially in Eastern Landers (also due to labour mobility).  
One in three regions saw increases until 2010 and have 
shown some resilience since then. These regions are located 
in particular in Belgium, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Austria, 
Sweden and the UK.
This table shows the ten regions the highest 
unemployment rates in 2012
MS Region GDP growth 2007-2010, %
ES Ciudad Autónoma de Ceuta 38.5
ES Andalucía 34.6
ES Extremadura 33.0
ES Canarias 33.0
EL Dytiki Makedonia 29.9
ES Melilla 28.6
FR Réunion 28.6
ES Castilla-La Mancha 28.5
ES Región de Murcia 27.9
EL Sterea Ellada 27.8
This table shows the ten regions with the biggest 
increase in unemployment rate in pp
MS Region Employment growth 
2007-2010, %
ES Ceuta 21.2
EL Sterea Ellada 19.3
EL Attiki 18.9
ES Extremadura 17.8
EL Kentriki Makedonia 17.7
EL Dytiki Makedonia 17.4
ES Castilla-La Mancha 16.9
ES Andalucía 16.8
EL Voreio Aigaio 16.7
EL Dytiki Ellada 15.935 35
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7.   Youth Unemployment, 2012
This indicator divides the number of people aged 15-24 who 
are without work but looking for work and available for 
work, by the number of people aged 15-24 and active in the 
labour market, i.e. those employed and unemployed. 
Why does this matter?
Unemployment at a young age can have a long-lasting neg-
ative impact, a ‘scarring effect’. In addition to higher risks of 
future unemployment, lower wages, these young people 
are also at a higher risk of social exclusion, of poverty and of 
facing health problems. High unemployment is one of the 
main drivers for young people to leave their regions.
How do the EU regions score?
Regional disparities in youth unemployment rates among 
the EU-27 regions are pronounced – with differences up to 
13 times between regions experiencing the highest and the 
lowest youth unemployment rates. 
Two regions out of five have a youth unemployment rate 
above 25 %. The highest youth unemployment rates are reg-
istered in Spain, Greece and Italy. In the top-30 regions in 
terms of youth unemployment, 29 are located in these three 
countries.
In contrast, only 15 % of the regions register youth unem-
ployment rates below 10 %, mainly located in Austria, 
Germany and the Netherlands. 
Between 2008 and 2012 youth unemployment increased in 
four out of five regions. The crisis hit severely regions of 
Greece, Spain (where the increase in youth unemployment 
was between 10 percentage points in Navarra and over 
27 p.p. in Asturias), Bulgaria, and Lithuania and Latvia. 
In contrast, youth unemployment rates dropped in regions, 
35 of them located in Germany, 5 in Belgium and 4 in Austria. 
This table shows the ten regions with the highest  
youth unemployment rate in 2010
MS Region Youth Unemployment 
rate, 2012
EL Dytiki Makedonia 73
ES Ciudad Autónoma de Ceuta 71
ES Canarias 63
ES Andalucía 62
ES Extremadura 62
EL Peloponnisos 61
ES Ciudad Autónoma 
de Melilla
61
EL Ipeiros 60
EL Kentriki Makedonia 60
EL Sterea Ellada 59
This table shows the ten regions with the largest
increase in youth unemployment rate, in pp
MS Region Youth Unemployment 
rate, 2008-2012
EL Peloponnisos 40
EL Kentriki Makedonia 38
EL Attiki 37
EL Dytiki Makedonia 36
PT Região Autónoma 
da Madeira
34
ES Extremadura 32
ES Castilla-La Mancha 32
ES Ciudad Autónoma  
de Ceuta
31
ES Andalucía 31
EL Sterea Ellada 3137 37
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8.   People aged 15 to 24 not in Employment, 
Education or Training (NEET), 2012
This indicator divides the number of people aged 15-24 that 
are not employed (both unemployed and inactive) and not 
involved in any education or training by the total number of 
people aged 15-24. 
Why does this matter?
People not in employment, education or training age 15-24 
are likely to be early school leavers and unlikely to have com-
pleted tertiary education. Europe 2020 aims to reduce the 
share of early school leavers and increase the share of ter-
tiary educated by 2020. In addition, a high share of NEETs 
can indicate increasing resignation among young people 
and lack of trust in state institutions, a major threat to social 
cohesion.
How do the EU regions score?
 Regional disparities in NEET rates among the EU-27 regions 
are pronounced – with differences up to 12 times between 
regions experiencing the highest and the lowest NEET rates.
The regions with the highest rates – with more than 1 out of 
5 young people not in employment, education and training 
– can be found in Bulgaria and Romania (for reasons of 
higher inactivity), as well as Italy, Spain, and Greece (for rea-
sons of higher unemployment).
In contrast, only 6 % of the regions (16 out of the 268 regions 
for which data were available) register NEET rates below 5 %, 
mainly located in the Netherlands. Regions with the lowest 
NEETs rates are also located Austria, Germany and the Czech 
Republic (the city of Prague).
Between 2008 and 2012 NEET rates increased in four out of 
five regions. The increase in NEET rates was particularly 
sharp for regions in Greece, Romania and Bulgaria with 
regional increases of 10 pp or more. 
In contrast, NEET rates dropped in 51 regions, most of these 
are located in Germany, Sweden, Finland and Austria. 
 
This table shows the ten regions with the highest NEET
rate in 2012, in % of population aged 15-24
MS Region NEET, 2012
BG Severozapaden  36
IT Sicilia  31
IT Campania 30
IT Calabria 30
FR Réunion 29
EL Peloponnisos 29
EL Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki 28
BG Yugoiztochen 28
ES Ciudad Autónoma de Ceuta 28
EL Sterea Ellada 27
This table shows the ten regions with the largest
increase NEET rate between 2008 and 2012, in pp
MS Region NEET rate,
2008-2012
EL Peloponnisos 14
IT Valle d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste 14
EL Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki 13
BG Severozapaden 12
RO Centru 12
EL Ipeiros 11
UK East Yorkshire and Northern
Lincolnshire
11
EL Dytiki Makedonia 10
UK Cumbria 10
BE Prov. Limburg (BE) 939 39
Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council
Eighth progress report on economic, social and territorial cohesion
Annexes40
Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council
Eighth progress report on economic, social and territorial cohesion
9. Net migration
Net migration is the difference between inward migration 
and emigration per thousand inhabitants. It is calculated by 
subtracting natural population change from total popula-
tion change.
Why does this matter? 
Migration can help to reduce regional disparities. In the 
receiving regions, it can boost employment and economic 
growth in by reducing labour shortages. The sending 
regions may witness a reduction of unemployment and an 
increase in money sent home by migrants (remittances). 
Rapid changes in total population, however, can lead to sig-
nificant adjustment costs to increase or decrease public 
services. 
How do the EU regions score?
Net migration turned negative or slowed down in many parts 
of the EU as a result of the crisis. In the transition regions, net 
migration dropped from 8.5 to 4.8 per thousand inhabitants. 
Nevertheless, the transition regions still have the highest aver-
age net migration rate. Regional Competitiveness and 
Employment (RCE) regions come close with a rate of 3.2 and 
the convergence regions trail behind with a rate of 0.4. 
The regions with the highest net migration rates are a mixture 
of Eastern, Western and Southern regions, including three 
capital regions. In many Eastern Member States, the capital 
region has the highest net migration. 
The crisis reduced migration in regions that experienced larg-
est inflows of labour migrants in the pre-crisis period, such as 
in Spain and Ireland. Despite the large reductions of net 
migration, many Spanish regions still had some of the highest 
levels of net migration. In Greece, migration dropped or 
remained stable, but all Greek regions kept a positive net 
migration rate. As the crisis continues to unfold, the increas-
ing differences in regional unemployment rates may still 
affect migration in the coming years. 
In Lithuania and Latvia, the crisis sped up the outflow with 
net migration rate moving from -2 to -8 and from -0.5 to -1.8 
respectively. In contrast, in Estonia, net migration remained 
close to zero in both periods.
This table shows the ten regions with the
highest average net migration, in 2007-10,
per thousand inhabitants
MS Region NEET, 2012
CZ Střední Čechy  16.3
LU Luxembourg  14.1
ES Illes Balears 13.2
ES Castilla-La Mancha 12.6
CZ Praha 12.6
BE Région de Bruxelles-
Capitale / Brussels
Hoofdstedelijk Gewest
12.5
IT Emilia-Romagna 12.4
IT Ciudad 11.5
ES Melilla 11.4
ES Región de Murcia 11.2
This table shows the ten regions where average net
migration decreased the fastest, between 2004-07
and 2007-10, in pro mille points
MS Region NEET rate,
2008-2012
ES La Rioja -14.8
ES Comunidad Valenciana -14.2
ES Cataluña -13.6
IE Southern and Eastern -13.4
CY Κύπρος / Kypros -12.2
ES Illes Balears -11.4
IE Border, Midland & Western -10.7
ES Región de Murcia -10.2
ES Canarias -9.5
ES Comunidad de Madrid -8.0
Convergence Transition RCE EU
Net migration, 2007-2010 per 1000 inhabitants 0.4 4.8 3.2 2.4
Change in net migration, 2007-10 vs 2004-07 per 1000 inhab. -0.6 -3.7 -1.3 -1.241 41
Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council
Eighth progress report on economic, social and territorial cohesion
Annexes42
Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council
Eighth progress report on economic, social and territorial cohesion
10.   Living in a household with  
a very low work intensity, 2011 
This indicator divides the number of people who are living 
in households with very low work intensity by the popula-
tion aged 0 to 59. Very low work intensity means that the 
adult(s) worked less than 20 % of their total work potential 
during the past year. Households composed only of chil-
dren, of students aged less than 25 and/or people aged 60 
or more are excluded.
Why does this matter? 
The Europe 2020 strategy aims to reduce the number of 
people at risk of poverty or exclusion in the EU with at least 
20 million by 2020. This includes persons living in a very low 
work intensity household.
How do the EU countries score?
The ten countries with the highest share include some which 
had a very impact of the crisis, such as Ireland, Latvia and 
Lithuania. It also includes several countries with a relatively 
low impact of the crisis such as Germany. In 2011, Cyprus and 
Luxemburg had the lowest shares (4.6 %, 5.8 % resp.).
Figure 1 shows the shares in cities and in towns, suburbs and 
rural areas per country. In half of the MS, the share is higher 
in cities, typically in Western MS. In a quarter of the MS the 
shares are higher outside the cities, mostly in Central and 
Eastern MS. In the remaining MS, the shares in and outside 
cities is very similar. 
At the EU level, the share only increased by 1 pp. The six MS 
with a very high impact of the crisis it increased most by 
between 4 and 9 pp. Ireland experienced the largest increase 
leading to a share of 23 %. On the other hand, Romania and 
Poland reduced it (-1.5 pp and -1 pp resp).
The changes in and outside cities did not show a clear pat-
tern (see Figure 2). In most countries the trend was similar in 
and outside cities. In Belgium and Sweden, very low work 
intensity in cities increased 3 pp more than outside cities. 
While in Bulgaria, Lithuania and Denmark very low work 
intensity increased by at least 3 pp more outside cities than 
inside. Overall, the pattern of urban advantage and disad-
vantage did not change due to the crisis. 
This table shows the ten countries with the
highest share of population aged 0-59 living  
in very low work intensity households
Country Persons living in very low work
intensity household, 2011
Ireland (2010) 22.9
Belgium 13.7
Latvia 12.6
Lithuania 12.3
Spain 12.2
Hungary 12.1
Greece 11.8
United Kingdom 11.5
Denmark 11.4
Germany 11.1
This table shows the ten countries with biggest
increase in the share of population aged 0-59 living in
very low work intensity households, 2008-2011 in pp
Country Change in share living in a
very-low-work-intensity
household, 2008-2011
Ireland (2008-2010) 9.3
Latvia 7.5
Lithuania 7.2
Spain 6
Estonia 4.6
Greece 4.4
Denmark 3.1
Bulgaria 2.9
Finland 2.5
Slovakia 2.443 43
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EU-27
Bulgaria
Lithuania
Hungary
Slovakia
Romania
Estonia
Spain
Ireland *
Cyprus
Latvia
Poland
Finland
Portugal
Czech Republic
Denmark
Slovenia
Italy
Luxembourg
Greece
Sweden
Netherlands
Germany
United Kingdom
France
Malta
Austria
Belgium
EU-27
Cyprus
Romania
Poland
Czech Republic
Germany
Denmark
Hungary
Netherlands
Slovenia
Malta
Italy
Austria
Slovakia
United Kingdom
Bulgaria
Luxembourg
France
Portugal
Finland
Belgium
Sweden
Greece
Estonia
Lithuania
Spain
Latvia
Ireland *
* 2010
Source: Eurostat
Cities Towns/Suburbs/Rural area
Cities Towns/Suburbs/Rural area
* 2008-2010
Source: Eurostat
Very low work intensity in- and out-side cities, 2011
Change in very low work intensity in- and out-side cities, 2008-201144
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11.   GDP/head, 2010 
This indicator measures the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
per head in Purchasing Power Standards. GDP is the total 
value of all goods and services produced. GDP/head is the 
level of output per inhabitant which is an indication of the 
average level of economic wealth generated per person. 
Purchasing Power Standards (PPS) eliminates differences in 
purchasing power due to different price levels between 
regions to facilitate comparisons.
Why does this matter? 
In general, the level of GDP per head is closely related to 
global economic performance, in particular to production 
factor productivity and employment. Its change over time 
shows the pace of economic development.
How do the EU regions score?
The GDP/head distribution highlights the very large gaps in 
economic output existing across regions and Member States 
of the European Union. In 2009, the GDP per head ranged 
from 331 % of the EU average (Inner London, UK) to 27.3 % 
(Severozapaden, Bulgaria). Between 2007 and 2009, ratio 
between the average of GDP per head in the top-20 and bot-
tom-20 regions decreased from 4.9 to 4.6. The regions with 
the highest GDP per capita in 2009 are mainly capital 
regions and located in Western or Northern Europe.
 The relatively high levels of GDP per head of capital regions 
can be in part explained by a large daily influx of commuters 
from neighbouring regions. At the other hand of the spec-
trum, the ten regions with the lowest GDP per capita are 
located in Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary.
Compared to the EU-27 average, between 2000 and 2010, 
GDP per head in PPS increased in particular in regions 
located in the Member States that joined the EU in 2004 and 
2007. Also regions located in Eastern Germany and Spain 
recorded a positive performance. Instead, negative perfor-
mances are recorded by regions located in Greece, Italy, 
France, the UK and southern Sweden and Finland.
Eight out of the top-10 regions in terms of GDP per head 
increases are capital regions. However, the region with the 
largest decrease is also a capital region: Brussels.
This table shows the ten regions with the highest  
GDP per head in PPS in 2010
MS Region GDP per head in
PPS, EU-27=100
UK Inner London* 328
LU Luxembourg (Grand-Duché)*  266
BE Bruxelles-Capitale / Brussels
Hoofdstedelijk Gewest*
223
DE Hamburg* 203
FR Île de France 180
NL Groningen** 180
SK Bratislavský kraj 176
CZ Praha 172
SE Stockholm 168
AT Wien* 165
* Overstated due to commuter inflow
** Overstated due to GVA from off-shore gas production
This table shows the ten regions with the biggest
increase in GDP per head in PPS between 2000  
and 2010, in difference in index points
MS Region GDP per head in
PPS, 2000-2010
SK Bratislavský kraj 67
RO Bucureşti - Ilfov 54
BG Yugozapaden 38
CZ Praha 34
NL Groningen 31
PL Mazowieckie 28
RO Vest 26
UK Inner London 26
HU Közép-Magyarország 24
LU Luxembourg 2245 45
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